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Town Meeting

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BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

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What Does the Crisis in China Mean to Us?

Moderator, GEORGE V. DENNY, JR.

Speakers

OWEN BREWSTER
JOHN GOETTE

ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS
JOHN K. FAIRBANK

(See also page 13)

COMING

—December 21, 1948—

What Should We Do To Win the Cold War With Russia?

—December 28, 1948—

Is Labor Entitled to Another Wage Increase?

Published by THE TOWN HALL, Inc., New York 18, N.Y.



CONTENTS



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THE BROADCAST OF DECEMBER 14:

"What Does the Crisis in China Mean to Us?"

<i>Mr. DENNY</i>	3
<i>Admiral ZACHARIAS</i>	4
<i>Mr. GOETTE</i>	6
<i>Dr. FAIRBANK</i>	8
<i>Senator BREWSTER</i>	11
THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN	13
QUESTIONS, PLEASE!	18



THE BROADCAST OF DECEMBER 21:

"What Should We Do To Win the Cold War With Russia?"



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"Is Labor Entitled to Another Wage Increase?"



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BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

GEORGE V. DENNY, JR., MODERATOR

DECEMBER 14, 1948

VOL. 14, No. 33

What Does the Crisis in China Mean to Us?

Moderator Denny:

Good evening, neighbors. There was a time here in America when we could afford the luxury of saying, "It doesn't make any difference what kind of government another nation has, so long as they let us alone." But today we've learned, at the tragic cost of two world wars and rearming for a third, that totalitarianism whether it is dressed in the clothing of a king or a dictator will *not* let us alone.

Whether we like it or not, we are the most powerful, the most productive, and the richest Nation in all the world today. We cannot occupy this position without accepting world-wide responsibilities. Therefore, when a great totalitarian power moves to extend its influence and control in Europe and Asia, it becomes the concern of every farmer in Iowa, every cattleman in Texas, every industrialist, businessman, housewife—in short, every citizen of America from coast to coast.

For the past 15 years, China has been a battle ground. For the first 12, it was against the invading armies of Japan. But World War II was scarcely over when civil war between the Chinese Communists and the government of Chiang Kai-shek broke out.

Now the Communists control approximately half of the territory of China, including Manchuria, and the fate of Chiang Kai-shek's government is in the balance.

Are the Chinese Communists under the control or domination of the men in the Kremlin? This question is of prime importance to us tonight as we consider tonight's subject.

According to an Associated Press report, yesterday in Shanghai, Paul Hoffman, head of our Economic Cooperation Administration, told newsmen that he would recommend continued aid to China in the event that the Chinese Communists or coalition government should overthrow

Chiang Kai-shek and if he were satisfied that the government represented all the people, guaranteed their freedom, and permitted the operation of free institutions, free speech, freedom of assembly, and a free press.

According to this afternoon's newspapers, peace rumors are circulating in Nanking and Shanghai, despite a stern denunciation by Chiang Kai-shek himself.

What then should be our policy toward the crisis in China now? This problem is squarely up to the American people through our Government in Washington and will be one of the first problems before the new Congress when it meets in Washington next month.

To counsel with us this evening we bring you four authorities on the question—Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias, Retired Naval officer; John Goette, a foreign correspondent; John K. Fairbank of Harvard University; and United States Senator Owen D. Brewster of Maine.

We are sorry that former Senator D. Worth Clark will not be with us tonight, but an illness prevented his keeping his engagement with us.

We'll hear first from Admiral Zacharias, a veteran of 38 years' service in the Navy—much of the time spent in China and Japan. During World War II, he commanded the heavy cruiser, Salt Lake City, on the momentous trip to Shangri-La, for the first air raid

over Japan. He is the author of the book, *Secret Missions*, a revealing chronicle of 25 years in the Orient, including the wars there. Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias, welcome to Town Meeting. (*Applause.*)

Admiral Zacharias:

Thank you, Mr. Denny, ladies and gentlemen. I'm sorry to find Senator Brewster in the opposite corner tonight, as we've seen eye-to-eye on many things in the past. The same applies to John Goette, but tonight, things are different. Dr. Fairbank and I are decidedly together in the opposite corner.

The vital interests of the United States in China are: the independence of their people under a sovereign government, and the maintenance of internal peace in order to open up the vast supplies of raw materials to the world and also the markets that could be available.

These interests pose for us three direct questions:

1. Are the Chinese Communists the same brand as those in western countries?

2. Will Russia be able to dominate a Chinese government in the hands of Chinese Communists?

3. Should we give further military aid to the present central government of China under Chiang Kai-shek, in order to prevent further advances of the so-called Chinese Communist armies?

To all of these questions, I

would answer emphatically in the negative. My reasons are based, not only upon my own observations of the Chinese over a considerable period, but also upon the opinions and conclusions of capable and trained observers who have had unusual opportunity for contact with Chinese of all population levels.

You and I know that the Chiang Kai-shek government is not a democratic government. Unfortunately, many people advocated Adolph Hitler as a bulwark against Communism. We know how costly that was.

You cannot fight a virulent disease with another disease. I can see no good in Communism or any other form of dictatorship.

The surprising thing today is that the so-called Communist armies of China have made their headway without the assistance of the Russians. When the Japanese surrendered, the Chinese Communists moved in and took over their rifles and ammunition.

The reason why the Russians did not take over this material themselves was because it was of a different calibre and was of no use to them. The Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung made and are making their headway, not because of Russian assistance, as was supposed, but because of the failure of Chiang Kai-shek to gain the confidence of his people.

In 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek made his northern drive, he did it

with the help of 50 Soviet advisors in China. They were headed by Borodin, the political Commissar, and General Galen, their military leader. They filled key positions.

China also received material assistance from the Russians. At that time, Chiang Kai-shek was in reality using Soviet support to an extent far greater than Mao Tse-tung is today. It is a fact that when Chiang arrived at Hankow, his big objective, he actually kicked out his Russian cohorts by loading them aboard a ship which sailed from China.

I have no doubt that Mr. Stalin has a clear idea of Chiang's record. Then was an opportunity for Chiang Kai-shek to have effected Chinese unity, according to the democratic principles of Sun Yat Sen. This he failed to do.

Casual visitors to China, as evidenced by recent confused magazine articles, are certain to mistake the growing nationalisms in Asia for Communist activities.

The United States has always stood for the independence of people. We do not desire and should not support in China any dictatorship, whether it stems from Stalinist Russia or a Chiang Kai-shek government which General Marshall has correctly pictured as a corrupt and inefficient regime.

General Marshall, because of his previous experience in China and his two recent trips there, maintains that we should give no fur-

ther aid to the present regime of China until they have eliminated the corrupt and inefficient leadership and administration.

General Stilwell made the following devastating statement and I quote, "The Chinese government is based on fear and favor. It is in the hands of an ignorant, arbitrary, and stubborn man, interlaced with family and financial ties and influence."

I would like to close with an optimistic note by saying, "We are not faced with two terrible alternatives in China—Chiang Kai-shek or Communism. The intellectuals and liberals who have been driven by Chiang's attitudes and failures into the ranks of Mao Tse-tung are the ones General Marshall described as the conservatives on the Communist side. They are the ones who can form a coalition which will bring democracy into China.

If Chiang Kai-shek is ousted, it is my sincere conviction that the succeeding group will form a coalition government which will include the so-called Chinese Communists, be representative of all sections of China, and from which a regime will emerge completely free from any Russian domination.

This morning's press states that Paul Hoffman, head of the ECA, will give aid to China if it is under an effective coalition with the essential freedoms preserved. We should not support any military aid beyond our present provisions made by Congress. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Admiral Zacharias. John Goette, our next speaker would have been a Philadelphia lawyer if it had not been for World War I. Instead, he served two years in the Navy, and thereafter spent 23 years in the Orient as a foreign correspondent. He was taken prisoner and held prisoner for seven months by the Japanese after Pearl Harbor Day. He is a frequent contributor to magazines and contributed over 300 pages of testimony as a witness in the Tojo war trial.

Now, Mr. Goette, we welcome your testimony on tonight's subject, "What Should Be Our Policy Toward the Crisis in China?" Mr. John Goette. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Goette:

The only point that I find myself in agreement on with Admiral Zacharias is that we're both surprised at being on opposite sides. Perhaps this is just as well because the usually overwhelmingly positive Admiral tonight is, in his own words, emphatically negative on the issues he raises himself. That puts me on the positive side—positively against a "do-nothing policy" for China.

American action, and not inaction, is called for in China's crisis. Let our Government declare at once that it is anti-Communist in Asia as in Europe, back those words with a Pacific defense pact similar to that proposed for

the Atlantic, then do everything else to uphold an anti-Communist Nationalist Government of China, have nothing to do with the coalition government that would include Communists under present conditions.

The Chinese people today are tired and discouraged. Twice in a generation, aggressive armies have marched over the land. First, it was the Japanese and, now, the alien-inspired Communists.

America, by friendly word and active support can give heart to the great mass of Chinese who are not Communists. I would say—if you could have a plebiscite in China today, which is not possible—that perhaps 90 to 95 per cent of the Chinese people would vote a solid "No" to Communism.

Admiral Zacharias, I can readily answer your question as to whether the Chinese Communists are the same brand as in Western countries. I answer in the printed words of your associate here tonight, the next speaker, Dr. Fairbank. In his recent book, Dr. Fairbank described the Chinese Communists as pro-Russian and anti-American.

This plainly puts the stamp of International Communism on the Chinese party and I think, to most of us Americans, those blunt words of Dr. Fairbank correctly portray the Chinese Communist Party as the open and avowed enemy of the United States and, remember, also, that enemy has a

powerful army over two million strong.

If Admiral Zacharias or any other American questions the warmth of Chinese Communism toward Soviet Communism, then let him go to the recent Bolton Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. There he'll find the stark story of Chinese Communism documented and reported by an American expert.

If the Admiral wants still further American documentation, then I give him former Senator D. Worth Clark and his dramatic report to the Senate Appropriations Committee. Had Mr. Clark been able to be here tonight, he would have defended his recommendations of sweeping aid to the Chiang government in words like these, "I believe the probable gain is worth the cost at this time. It would represent only a small part of our foreign aid program. It could save half the world from the Iron Curtain."

Mark that reference to an Asiatic Iron Curtain. Then remember that from 1921, Moscow fastened on China as a Communist laboratory, a laboratory for the problems of semidependent regions. From this Chinese Communist core has fanned out over Asia to such an extent that in the past twelve months, every nation in Asia except occupied Japan and independent Siam, has witnessed an armed Communist uprising.

In most of these cases, if not in

all of them, Chinese Communists either participated or were the link between International Communism and the native uprising. Thus when we stop Communism in China, we destroy the nerve center of such a menace to American security in the Pacific.

There are other things we should stop for our own good. I refer to the thoughtless repetitions about corruption and inefficiency of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Admiral Zacharias used it just now.

Admitted there's corruption and inefficiency in China. I would like something better and so would most of the Chinese. But we do face the Communist menace and I expect Admiral Zacharias, a well-trained naval man, to measure the logistics of this American problem.

We cannot change the Nationalist Chinese quickly. In China, they are the only material we have at hand. For our own defense, let us make the maximum use of this friendship. Let's stop insulting them with these slogans so welcome to the Communists.

The Communists likewise urge the "no-aid policy," just favored by the Admiral. Back in 1945, William Z. Foster, head of the American Communist Party declared, "The key task is to stop American intervention in China."

Thus, the less we do for Chiang Kai-shek, arch enemy of Communism for the past 21 years, the

happier are Communists the world over.

Hence, I, as an American concerned primarily with our own security say: If Mr. Hoffman's comment on giving economic aid to a coalition government implies coalition with Communists, I view that as dangerous appeasement.

Instead of appeasement, support the National Government of China with everything and in every way until both China and America find peace in a non-Communist Asia. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Mr. Goette. Few educators have had the opportunity to study the situation in China as thoroughly as has Dr. John K. Fairbank, Professor of History at Harvard University. He spent many years in China in the service of our Government and is author of a recently published book, *The United States and China*. We are very happy to welcome to Town Hall, Dr. John K. Fairbank of Harvard. (*Applause.*) Dr. Fairbank.

Dr. Fairbank:

Ladies and gentlemen. The last speaker, Mr. Goette, has just said at some length that Chinese Communist domination of China would be Communist and highly undesirable. I agree. This is an admirable position to take, Mr. Goette, like being against sin, but it's largely beside the point.

The real point is not whether to

oppose Communism in China but how to oppose it effectively.

What shall we do about the Chinese Communist victories over Chiang Kai-shek?

Can we really check Chinese Communism by trying to send increased military aid to Chiang, or may that effort merely put us in a worse position? On this, Mr. Goette has not said much.

I should like to ask him and Senator Brewster a question: Why have Chiang's American-equipped armies been surrendering? As Admiral Zacharias pointed out, Chiang's armies have received more arms from the United States than the Chinese Communists have got from Japanese stocks or from Russia. I defy anyone to prove the opposite.

Chiang's armies have an American supplied air force, which the Chinese Communists have not. Why are Chiang's armies so helpless? Chiang's own chief of staff said yesterday in Nanking, "Government forces in the disputed area outnumber the Communist forces 350,000 to 300,000 but most of the government troops are in the Communist traps."

In other words, a larger Nationalist force with tanks and planes and superior arms is mysteriously helpless against the Communists. This needs to be explained before we start sending increased military aid to Chiang.

Personally, I think there are two

major reasons for Chiang's inability to stop the Communists.

1. The Chinese Communists, who are real Communists, have succeeded in getting organized popular support among the masses of Chinese peasants in the little peasant villages that dot the Chinese countryside.

2. Chiang Kai-shek's armies, like a great many of his officials and most of the Chinese people, have lost confidence in him. In other words, Chiang has been competing with the Chinese Communists for twenty years now to see who could get the support or at least the acquiescence of the Chinese people.

Chiang has lost the competition. This means that if we now keep on supporting Chiang with arms, we, who most believe in democracy and self-determination, may soon find ourselves supporting him against most of the people of China. (*Applause.*)

He will be on our side all right, but most of the four hundred million Chinese may be against us—just as the Communists are hoping. So our increased military aid to Chiang, instead of saving China might play directly into Communist hands.

Americans who still think a purely military solution will work in China overlook the main point. The present Chinese revolution began long before the Chinese ever heard of Russian Communism. In

fact, American missionaries and teachers helped this social revolution get started, but the Chinese Communists have finally taken over the leadership and control of the social revolution by applying Russian Communist ideas and methods to Chinese conditions.

The Communists offer the poor peasants reading, writing, improved farming methods, more land, less rent and taxes. Richer peasants they may victimize by violence, brutality, or terror. Either way, by good means or bad means, they organize the peasant villages and use them.

No amount of American guns can beat this Communist system, any more than the Japanese could beat it, unless and until the Chinese who are fighting Communism learn to work with the peasantry for social reforms. This is where we have been losing out, because we have been trying to support anyone in China who was anti-Communist, whether or not he was for reform and social change.

Chiang Kai-shek said he would fight the Communists first and reform afterwards. Some members of the 80th Congress fell for this military line of thinking: fight first and reform afterwards.

Chiang is losing, and the aid-to-China policy of the 80th Congress is bankrupt because the Chinese Communists have got a system for fighting and reforming both at the same time while Chiang has not.

All Asia is ripe for social revolution. The thing that will beat Communism in Asia is social reform — not military force alone. (*Applause.*)

We simply can't win by backing nonreformers. Therefore, I think Paul Hoffman took the right stand yesterday in Shanghai, to continue aid to any Communist or coalition government that might follow Chiang Kai-shek, provided it represented all the people, guaranteed their freedom, and permitted free institutions.

Hoffman said the principal purpose of the ECA is to help the people. That is a smart bargaining position, in my view. It is based on principles in which all of us and many Chinese firmly believe. It puts any new Chinese government on the spot to live up to it.

So I think our policy has to be based on a calculated risk. Instead of putting billions, that we need in Europe, into a very dubious military gamble, to try to save Chiang when his people don't want him, I think we have to go slow. I think we have to wait and see.

This is a less dangerous gamble than sending increased military aid to Chiang who is no longer a bulwark against Communism. Chiang is not the same as the Chinese people.

I asked Senator Brewster, do you think Chiang has Chinese popular support or not? If he

has popular support why is he losing it? If he hasn't popular support, how can we gain by backing him further. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Dr. Fairbank. Our program of aid-to-China is of vital concern to our next speaker who is a member of the Senate Finance Committee, the distinguished Republican Senator from the State of Maine, who's also a member of the Special Senatorial Committees which visited China in 1943 and 1946 for first-hand observation.

Senator Owen Brewster, what do you think our policy should be toward China now? Senator Brewster. (*Applause.*)

Senator Brewster:

My earnest, prayerful hope is that our opponents tonight are right, and that we can, in the future, if it shall come, find that Admiral Zacharias and Dr. Fairbank are justified in believing that we can get into bed with Communism in China, although we are trying to kick Communists out of bed everywhere else in the world, but I very much fear this is wishful thinking.

As I look at the performance of the Communist wolf elsewhere in the world, all I can think of is Little Red Riding Hood.

Let us, in the words of Al Smith, "Look at the record." No government in the world and no organization, labor or otherwise, has found it possible to put Com-

munists in positions of power without feeling immediately betrayal.

Loyalty to the Communist ideology overrides every other loyalty to country or society.

Witness Poland and all the other countries behind the Iron Curtain. See what happened in Brazil and Chile. Look at the day-by-day revelations as to what is going on in our own country in government and in labor.

Admiral Zacharias complains because Chiang kicked out the Communists and refused to take them back into the government. Apparently, Mr. Hoffman, today, considers Communists may be good bedfellows. Then, why are we spending a million dollars a day to keep the air life going to Berlin? And two million a day to keep the Communists out of Greece?

Is General Clay mistaken in thinking it is difficult to do business with good old Joe?

Chiang fought the Japanese for four long years all alone, while America supplied the Japs with aviation gas and scrap iron and the British shut off Chinese supplies over the Burma Road. Chiang then fought the Japanese four years longer with the very limited supplies we could fly in over The Hump after providing for Chennault.

Chiang accepted at face value American and British assurances that China would receive back all the territory taken from China by force, only to find the Communists

given, by secret agreement of which not even General Marshall was advised, a dominating position in mineral-rich Manchuria, and in Port Arthur.

Charges against the good faith of Chiang come with very poor grace from those guilty of such a treacherous double-cross. Russia promptly turned over the vast stores of Japanese war material in Manchuria to the Chinese Communists although Stalin was pledged to cooperate with the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

I do not know how many supplies were given by the Russians to the Chinese Communists, nor do I think they know. I do know, however, how much we have sent, and it is pitifully inadequate. (*Applause.*)

Dr. Fairbank stresses the techniques of the Communists in promoting social revolution. Stalin is, perhaps, a better authority as to the relative importance of guns or propaganda in promoting revolution, as revealed in his cynical inquiry as to "how many divisions has the Pope?"

They talk of corruption. Well, waste, corruption, and extravagance have always been incident to war, as Washington and Lincoln found out and the Truman Committee made most plain, but no one has ever challenged the personal integrity or patriotic purpose of Chiang. My witnesses on that score are the men who served with him and fought the war—General

Chennault; General Wedemeyer who served with him two years; General Hurley, our Ambassador to China. They are the men who testified to his purpose.

Let us be sensible. Everywhere in the world, we are recognizing Communism as our most deadly enemy. The battle is growing. Chiang is the one hope of preserving four hundred and fifty million Chinese from Communist domination, and that means more than a billion in the Orient. By every consideration of self-interest, as well as a decent respect for the opinion of mankind, American policy should be to do everything in our power, short of military intervention, to preserve the government of Chiang Kai-shek, as the only bulwark against Communist domination of all Asia, and the growing menace that will offer to free men and free institutions everywhere. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Senator Brewster. Now gentlemen for a little further discussion, will you join me up here around the microphone? Admiral Zacharias, we haven't heard from you for a while, perhaps you would like to start our discussion with comment or question.

Admiral Zacharias: Yes, I'd like to address this to Senator Brewster. He has indicated the great effort that the Chinese have put forth in fighting our battles for us out there. I find out from compe-

tent sources that the classification of the Chinese military effort during the war has been classed as

zero. Now, how can you reconcile that and what did the Chinese actually accomplish during the war

THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

ELLIS MARK ZACHARIAS—Rear Admiral Zacharias, USN, retired, is a radio commentator on foreign affairs and author of the recent book *Secret Mission*. Born in Jacksonville, Florida, in 1890, Admiral Zacharias is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. Commissioned an ensign in 1912, he advanced through the grades to rear admiral. During World War I, he served in various capacities aboard battleships, as engineering officer and as gunnery officer. From 1920 to 1923, Admiral Zacharias was an attache to the American Embassy in Tokyo. During this time he was a student of the Japanese language and people. Following several years as officer in charge of the eastern division of the Office of Naval Intelligence, he became district intelligence officer of the 11th Naval District with headquarters at San Diego in 1938.

In 1940, Admiral Zacharias became commander of the cruiser Salt Lake City, in the bombardment of enemy bases on the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. Later he was made commander of the battleship New Mexico, and following that, chief of staff of the 11th Naval District. During part of 1945, he was on temporary duty with the commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet conducting psychological warfare against the Japanese High Command.

Since his retirement in 1946, Admiral Zacharias has engaged in writing and lecturing. He is the author of *Secret Missions*, *The Story of an Intelligence Officer*, *Eighteen Words That Bagged Japan*, and *Balance Sheet of Disaster*.

JOHN K. FAIRBANK—Dr. Fairbank is a professor of history at Harvard. In 1942-43, he was special assistant to the American Ambassador in China, and in 1945-46, was director of U. S. Information in China. He is author of the new book, *The United States and China*, which was edited by Sumner Welles.

RALPH OWEN BREWSTER—Republican Senator from Maine, Owen Brewster was born in Dexter, Maine, in 1888. He received an A.B. degree from Bowdoin College and LL.B. degree from Harvard; and L.L.D. degrees from the University of Maine and from Bowdoin. He has been a member of the Maine House of Representatives (1917-19; 1921-23) and the Maine Senate (1923-25); and was Governor of Maine for two terms (1925-29). As a Republican Representative from Maine, he served in the 74th to 76th United States Congresses (1935-41). He

has been a Senator since 1941 and is a member of the Senate Finance Committee and Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee.

During World War I, Senator Brewster was a member of the Maine National Guard, advancing to captain and regimental adjutant. He entered the Officers' Training School at Camp Zachary Taylor, and continued there until after the Armistice was signed.

In 1943, he was a member of the committee of five Senators, making a global flight representing the Truman Committee to investigate the war program.

He is a member of the Senate Finance Committee and chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program.

JOHN GOETTE—Newspaper correspondent, author, and lecturer, John Goette was born in Philadelphia where he later attended Central High School and the Law School of Temple University. In 1917, he entered the U. S. Naval Reserve and served in England and France. He spent 1920 studying and writing in India, and China. This was followed by a period with the China Famine Relief.

In 1926, Mr. Goette became a correspondent at the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva. As a roving correspondent, he traveled widely in the United States, Europe, Palestine, Egypt, Java, and Asia. He was war correspondent with the Chinese Army during the Manchurian-Chinese crisis; with the Japanese Army during the Sino-Japanese Shanghai warfare. From 1923 to 1941 he was chief China correspondent for the International News Service. From 1927 to 1939, he was a correspondent for the London Daily Express.

Mr. Goette was a correspondent with the Japanese Army in the North China Campaign from 1937 until the United States entered the war in December, 1941, when he was taken prisoner. In June, 1942, he was repatriated and returned to New York City. Following the war, he returned to the Orient, where he was a correspondent in Japan, Korea, China, and Manchuria. He testified at the trial of the Japanese war criminals in Tokyo.

A specialist on jade, Mr. Goette is the author of *Jade Lore*. He is also the author of *Japan Fights for Asia*, a contributor to magazines, a book reviewer, and a lecturer for the U. S. Treasury and United China Relief.

to help us as against the efforts of our own people to get Chiang Kai-shek to fight.

Senator Brewster: Well, as I said, my witnesses on that score are General Chennault who spent the last (*laughter*)—I think that if there is anyone who scorns the battle of General Chennault, they do not understand America. Certainly no man was a greater patriot. (*Applause.*) For 10 years, he spent out there leading the Flying Tigers, before we were in the war and after. He is the one who testified as to the cooperation which I saw him carrying out with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. . .

And what did we do, meanwhile, to help? From 1936 to 1945, we gave them practically nothing at all as Chennault and Wedemeyer both testified. In 1946, after the war, for ten solid months we had an embargo on shipment of arms to China imposed by General Marshall in an attempt to force Chiang to take Communists into his government. For ten months following there were practically no arms shipped, and this last year we have shipped to China one-third as much munitions as we have shipped to Greece. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you. All right, Mr. Fairbanks.

Dr. Fairbank: Well, I'd just like to suggest that there were others besides General Chennault and Chiang Kai-shek who were fighting that war. (*Applause.*)

We're not debating now who did the most fighting in the past; we're debating now how to stop Communism and whether you can do it with somebody who is discredited with his own people.

As to this question, "Did we give Chiang any aid?" we only fought a war in China ourselves and gave them a lot of the supplies left over from it. In the meantime, we trained and equipped 39 divisions in the Chinese Army that Chiang had at the end of the war. We lent him half a billion or more dollars, so that he had a billion dollars more in exchange at the end of the war. We gave him 271 naval vessels and an air force—something like eight groups.

He's now got very little of that left—not because we didn't give it to him, but because he couldn't keep it from his own opposition.

Senator Brewster: I'm sure you don't understand that he has never received the eight air groups which were pledged him, nor has he received many of the other pledges that were made as General Wedemeyer testified before the Senate Committee. (*Applause.*)

Dr. Fairbank: I know all about that slowness of recent deliveries. I'm talking about aid that went to Chiang before the end of the war. The slowness of recent deliveries was partly because the Chinese just couldn't make up their minds to get in their orders.

Senator Brewster: How did we deliver to him before the end of

the war? (Both talking at once.)

Mr. Denny: What was that question?

Senator Brewster: How did we deliver to him before the end of the war?

Dr. Fairbank: We trained these troops in Chungking and in Burma, the new First Army and the new Sixth Army—they were best thing ever seen in China. They were fully equipped, and we transported them into Manchuria to forestall the Chinese Communists and what happened? They surrendered not long ago!

Dr. Fairbank: I'd like to ask Senator Brewster, do you think Chiang has popular support or not? If he has, why is he losing? If he hasn't how can we gain by backing him further? (*Applause.*)

Senator Brewster: I have indicated that I think guns are very much more powerful than any other force. That has been demonstrated in the two million Communists who dominate Russia. It has been demonstrated in every Communist-dominated country behind the Iron Curtain, and is being demonstrated there.

Chiang certainly had the support of the Chinese people for 15 long years while he carried on. It was not until Russian Communists turned over all the Japanese war materiel in vast extent that the Communist Army of two million then began to make inroads. That is the answer to the Chinese situation.

Mr. Denny: Mr. Goette?

Mr. Goette: I would like to call your attention that you are holding a wake before you got a corpse. (*Laughter.*) Chiang Kai-shek and the anti-Communist Chinese are not dead yet, nor has the vast part of Nationalist China been taken by the Communists.

Manchuria is gone. But remember this, Chiang Kai-shek's government went into power in 1927—he never had control there in Manchuria, except for a year or so, then the Japanese took it in 1931 and the Russians and Communists later on; so, discount Manchuria.

That allows a small part of North China and all the rest of China, south of the Yangtse. So there is still a lot of fight in Chiang Kai-shek and those anti-Communist Chinese.

Mr. Denny: Admiral Zacharias?

Admiral Zacharias: I'd like to get back to that question of the effort that was put forth by the Chinese during this war. That is one of the things that precipitated this dispute about getting the supplies into China over the Hump. As we know, and as Dr. Fairbank pointed out, an army was trained in China which was something that had never been seen before. It was under General Stilwell that they made the advances in Burma, and conducted an offensive there that the Chinese didn't dream they were capable of doing themselves.

Now, what happened while those activities were going on? We know that orders countermanding the directions of General Stilwell, who was supposed to be in command of the Chinese Communist Armies, came direct from Chungking and Chiang Kai-shek himself through subordinate leaders, which nullified his efforts.

Now, what caused that? I'm afraid it is because the air force out there was saying, quite glibly, what they could do, and finally Chiang Kai-shek said, "If they can do that, it is not necessary for us to fight. Let's let them do it." (Laughter.)

Mr. Denny: Mr. Goette. Would you comment on that?

Mr. Goette: I'd just like to throw a military question at Admiral Zacharias and ask him how much of their equipment, when he last commanded at the time these Chinese units were armed by us, is still in existence?

War material is expendable. This is five or six years ago that they're talking about arming these Chinese troops and they've been fighting ever since. Suppose they have nothing left, that's merely normal expenditure of military material.

Mr. Denny: Admiral Zacharias?

Admiral Zacharias: If there had been something to justify further things going in there, I'm certain that there would have been, but we've not received that at any time during the Chiang Kai-shek

regime. He had plenty of opportunity during his ten years, after that northern drive in 1927, to bring about those reforms, consolidate his position, and bring democracy into China, and, although war started in Manchuria four years after that, in 1931, he wasn't concerned with that. It was between the Japanese and Chang Hsueh-liang.

Senator Brewster: I'd like to ask a question now.

Mr. Denny: Yes, Senator?

Senator Brewster: I would like to ask these gentlemen of the opposition whether they defend or justify the pledge of Manchuria's control to the Russians in violation of their pledge to Chiang Kai-shek?

Dr. Fairbank: No, I don't defend that. I think it was a mistake. Now, my first—

Senator Brewster: Wasn't it something worse than a mistake? (Laughter.) Surely it was a tragedy.

Admiral Zacharias: I don't think we ever made a pledge. (Applause.)

Mr. Denny: What was that you said, Senator Brewster?

Senator Brewster: That it was worse than a mistake. It was a betrayal. (Applause.)

Mr. Denny: And Admiral Zacharias made a comment—

Admiral Zacharias: We have never made any such pledge. Now for this reason, I think you're referring to Yalta, and I think—

Senator Brewster: No, I'm referring to Cairo where the pledge was made to Chiang Kai-shek; at Yalta, he was betrayed. (*Applause.*)

Admiral Zacharias: Well, any commitment we made to turn over to the Russians anything that belonged to China was continued upon China's agreement, and China has never agreed, so we did not break a pledge.

Mr. Denny: Mr. Fairbank?

Dr. Fairbank: Instead of fighting the war again, come back to our present situation. Now my first question having got no answer that I could appreciate (*applause*), I have another question, or I put it another way to either Senator Brewster or Mr. Goette. What prospect is there that Chiang Kai-shek, after 20 years of promises and failures to reform, so he could compete with communism, can still pull off reforms and get popular support? (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Well, we'll let Mr. Goette answer that.

Mr. Goette: Of course, I don't agree with all those failures. Dr. Fairbank doesn't point out the fact that in this 21-year career of this National Government in China—China has gotten out from under the unequal treaties which bound her for a hundred years. She's become one of the Big Five in the United Nations and played a very creditable role there. I don't think anyone would deny that. There are some of the successes.

At the same time, they've had to bear the brunt of running the whole country, running China's international affairs, while the Communists, that Dr. Fairbank says have done such a good job, have run it back in the little villages. They've never proven their ability in the bigger cities.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. I'm sorry, but we've got to get ready for our question period now. I'm sure that you, our listeners, will be interested in the following message.

Announcer: You are listening to the 538th broadcast of America's Town Meeting originating tonight in Town Hall, New York. We are about to take questions from the audience.

For your convenience, Town Hall prints each week a complete text of each Town Meeting, including the questions and answers to follow in the Town Meeting Bulletin. Copies of tonight's program, as well as past and future programs, may be secured by writing to Town Hall, New York 18, N.Y., enclosing 10c to cover the cost of printing and mailing. You should allow at least two weeks for delivery.

If you would like to subscribe to the Bulletin for six months, enclose \$2.35, or for a year send \$4.50. Or, if you would like a trial subscription, enclose \$1.00 for eleven issues.

The question period which fol-

lows is completely spontaneous and unrehearsed. In order to discard irrelevant and useless questions, members of the audience are asked to write their questions of twenty-five words on a card and send them back to an Assistant Moderator by one of the ushers. If the question is approved, the usher returns it and during the question period the questioner holds up one, two, three or four fingers to indicate to the moderator

the person to whom his question is directed. This is to keep from having too many questions for the same person. Mr. Denny is now spotting two or three members of the audience to begin the question period and the big parabolic microphone on either side of the stage and the television cameras are being trained on the questioner. Mr. Denny will recognize first. Now for our question period, we return you to Mr. Denny.

QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

Mr. Denny: We'll start our question period with the gentleman in the center aisle.

Man: I'm a Retired Rear Admiral like Admiral Zacharias. I'm Rear Admiral Powell. I would like to ask him whether or not, as applied to China, he thinks that there are two kinds of communism—one good, in China, and the other, the Moscow variety, which we all detest?

Mr. Denny: Are there a good and a bad? Is that your question?

Admiral Zacharias: I intended to indicate, and I still indicate, that the Chinese are going to be something different from those Communists in western countries for this reason: because of the inherent characteristics of the Orientals, and, particularly, the Chinese. You ask any Chinese in this country today—in this audience—

what he thinks is the greatest country in the world and he'll tell you China. They're all proud of their country. Because of the molding of those characters and the influences that have been brought to bear upon them for thousands of years, I cannot see how an experimental ideology that's had only 30 fleeting years in the crucible of time are going to make any inroads on the Chinese.

As you know, they have absorbed every invader and upset anybody that's tried to go into their country. I do not believe that the Russians have anything to give to the Chinese. It's an agrarian rather than an industrial nation over there, which does not provide the fertile soil for the European brand of communism because they are trying to upset capitalism. There isn't any capitalism in China so how are they

going to work there? That's what I want to know? (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you. I think we ought to give another Admiral a chance to talk back. Are you satisfied with his answer, Admiral Powell?

Admiral Powell: No, sir! (*Laughter and applause.*)

Mr. Denny: All right, thank you. Then we'll return to the lady with the red feather in her hat.

Lady: My question is addressed to Senator Owen Brewster. What has the Chiang government done for the Chinese people other than give them famine and instability all these years? Don't you think the Kuomintang government has had time enough now to end the feudalism that exists in China?

Senator Brewster: Well, I think that it's been very difficult to accomplish all these things you indicate, when they had to spend ten years fighting the Japanese and now five years fighting the Communists. When you consider the difficulties in our own country, isolated as we were, it is not to me any amazement that Chiang has not been able to carry out all the reforms that were desired.

I have what General Marshall said as to the Communists' intent. This is what he testified to before the Senate Committee. "The Communist forces have brought about terrible destruction to wreck the economy of China. This is their vowed purpose to force an economic collapse."

It is not, to me, any wonder that Chiang has not been able, in the face of all these forces conspiring against him, to bring about the reforms which we certainly all recognize are to be desired. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Mr. Goette, I didn't take your comment on that first question. Did you want to comment on Admiral Zacharias' response there?

Mr. Goette: I should very much like to do so. In fact, in doing this, I'm defending the Chinese Communists, because that isn't the way I heard it, when I talked with Chou En-lai and other Communists in China they would be very resentful of being called non-Marxist International Communists. They said, "That's what we are. That's what we stand for. We want eventual Marxism in China." And you have that in records from Mao Tse-tung, the chief communist leader, in his book, *New Democracy*, which is available in several English translations, and there it is for all to read, so to say they're not International Communists is pure folly. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Now the gentleman down here in the fourth row.

Man: My question is directed to Professor Fairbank. Is it not, Professor, in our own self-interest in the present crisis, to feed and clothe the Chinese people at large on the sole basis of need?

Dr. Fairbank: Yes, I think it

certainly is. I think that we've got to compete, and we've got to do it by more than arms. We can't do it by arms alone. We're not making any progress that way. We've got the same problem all over the rest of Asia.

Mr. Denny: All right. Thank you. The little lady down here with glasses. Yes? Just under the balcony.

Lady: Mr. Goette. Wouldn't aid to the Nationalist Government really result in a war between the United States and Russia, and wouldn't we want to avoid this?

Mr. Goette: Of course, we want to avoid war with Russia, but we aren't the ones that are calling the turn. When Mr. Fairbank said, "Well, let's wait and see where Communism goes in China," you're allowing International Communism to lay their own rules. If they decide to fight or whatever they decide to do, they're the ones calling the turn. That's what we would be up against in China. We haven't forged the challenge; we haven't thrown the gauntlet down. It's the communists that have done it.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Dr. Fairbank has a comment on that.

Dr. Fairbank: We can't decide this entire question here in the United States. There's a war going on in China. The Communists appear to be winning it. The Chinese people are involved in the situation and we can't change their minds entirely from this distance.

I'm not advocating that the Chinese Communists take over China. I'm just calling your attention to the headlines in the papers.

How do we respond to this situation? In the same negative, militaristic way we have used in the past, or do we try to get a more constructive approach, as this gentleman was suggesting a moment ago by some kind of economic program—not necessarily divorced from some military program, but at least on a former foundation in principle than what we've been doing.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. You've got Mr. Goette on his feet now.

Mr. Goette: Well, I'd like to ask Dr. Fairbank how long this program that he outlines would take. To me it seems it would be several generations. In the meantime, the Communists are marching ahead to their own purposes.

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Dr. Fairbank?

Dr. Fairbank: I'm trying to slow down the Communists marching ahead. (*Laughter.*) And it's possible for people like Mr. Goette and Senator Brewster, who are very sincere American patriots, to give the Communists just what they want—namely, American intervention in China of a military sort that will unify China completely under Communist domination, with no chance of our ever getting them out of it. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you. The gentleman on the center aisle.

Man: Senator Brewster. You suggested that we disregard humanitarian ideals in favor of brute force, but do you still think that it is good power politics to incite the hatred of one-fifth of humanity by supporting reaction against the peoples' will of the last one hundred years? (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Senator Brewster. Is that what you lawyers call a leading question, Senator?

Senator Brewster: Well, I had supposed that certainly no one from China would challenge the necessity of using force to protect their homes, after the gallant battle the Chinese have made throughout history against the Japanese and every other foreign invader.

Now we are faced with the question of whether this can be solved by argument alone. It seems to me clear that Russian Communists will almost inevitably dominate China. That is the history everywhere else in the world. For my witness on that score, I will call on Dr. Raymond Walsh of New York, who had this to say this last week, "All honor and respect to the Communists who are leading the Chinese revolution. In six to twelve months when Chiang is dead, and the liberation forces have taken over in China and all the colonial areas in Asia also have been liberated,

then, when the representative of the Soviet Union in the United Nations rises and says he speaks for more than one-half of mankind, we Americans will have to hang our heads in shame."

That is the characterization of Dr. Raymond Walsh as to what we may expect with a Communist victory in China. I think Dr. Walsh knows whereof he speaks. I, as one American, cannot view the domination of the billion people of the Orient from Moscow with anything but very profound concern. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Admiral Zacharias?

Admiral Zacharias: I'd like to express an opinion about this steady advance in Communism. I think the indication in Europe now is that Communism is on the down grade. What we have going on in Yugoslavia today is an upset of the desires of Moscow and also of what we have going on in Poland and Czechoslovakia is a direct indication that Communism is not going to make the progress that it has in the past.

I want to emphasize again that in China it is not capitalism versus Communism. You've got over there dictatorships of different varieties trying to get control. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Senator Brewster?

Senator Brewster: I think it is most interesting in Admiral Zacharias to cite the European situation. If we will do for China one-

tenth of what we have done for Europe, I believe the whole problem would be solved. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Dr. Fairbank.

Dr. Fairbank: I am absolutely convinced that Senator Brewster is against Communism, and I want to assure that I am too. (*Applause.*) I view with alarm any taking over of Asia by Russia, but we're not debating that this evening. We're saying, "How can we stop it, and should we send increased military aid to Chiang Kai-shek as a practical measure that will have any value or effect?" That's what we're discussing; not the principle of whether we are for or against Communism. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: All right, thank you. Mr. Goette has a comment.

Mr. Goette: I should like to put this comment in the form of a very serious question to this Chinese gentleman who asked it. That is, did he, as I did, travel in Manchuria and see the destruction there of the large cities like Mukden, Chungchun, the factories ruined, the iron mines empty, all before the Nationalists ever got there after V-J day? It was done, first, by the Soviet Red Army and then by the Communist Red Army, and he asks, who is responsible for the destruction in China today?

Mr. Denny: I wish there were time for more, Mr. Goette. We ought to have another half hour here tonight, but we haven't.

Now, while our speakers prepare their summaries of tonight's question, here is a special message of interest to you.

Announcer: A favorite question asked by Town Meeting listeners as they consider the many problems before us in a democracy is "But what can I do?" Mr. Denny has prepared a brief twelve-point answer to this question in a small pocket-sized pamphlet called *What Can You Do?* There have been so many demands for this pamphlet that a second edition has just been printed. You may secure your copy by sending 10c to Town Hall, New York 18, New York, asking for the pamphlet by Mr. Denny, entitled, *What Can You Do?* It tells you how you can be an active citizen, how you can play your part in making this democracy ours work and you can read it in less than ten minutes.

Now for the summaries of tonight's discussion, here is Mr. Denny.

Mr. Denny: Now, a final word from Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster: Our policy proposes to preserve China from communist domination if it is humanly possible, without our military intervention. Our opponents admit the Moscow influence in Chinese communism, but hope the Chinese will eliminate this influence after communism is once dominant.

They disregard the lesson of every communist-dominated

country. If they are wrong, Moscow will be in a position to mobilize for world conquest more than half the population of the globe upon the greatest single land mass within calculable resources. That is a hazard I do not dare to take.

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Senator Brewster. Now, Dr. Fairbank.

Dr. Fairbank: Senator Brewster is very persuasive and sincere. He might almost persuade me, unless I recollect what nonsense it is to idealize a foreign potentate like Chiang Kai-shek, to take his view against that of our own Secretary Marshall, to assume that we are responsible for Chiang's failure to keep Chinese popular support.

Chiang isn't any more a bulwark against communism. Chinese Communists are regular Communists, but they're also Chinese.

We shouldn't send increased military aid to Chiang. We have to take our chances in China and stand ready to bargain with a coalition government in support of our democratic principles. We have to compete against communism constructively and not just by shipping guns. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Dr. Fairbank. Now, Mr. Goette.

Mr. Goette: I say to Admiral Zacharias, "You cannot have a well-intentioned coalition with Communists, particularly when the Chinese Red Army snatches at the fruit of military success."

To Dr. Fairbank I say: your long-termed calculated risk must be gratifying to communism, but utterly dangerous to American security. Hence, I call for no appeasement in a Communist coalition. Let's have a forceful Presidential declaration now against communism in Asia. Let Washington immediately direct an all-out policy against bayonet-imposed communism in China. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Now Admiral Zacharias.

Admiral Zacharias: The course of the United States is clear. We must be realistic in avoiding any support to an ineffective government which perpetuates a situation prejudicial to the future peace.

We have tried to help China in the past, and it has been worse than useless. I think we can count upon them to avoid an exchange of one form of dictatorship for another.

We have the elements for an effective regime if the present obstructions are removed. Let us take the same course and allow the Chinese to work out their own problems. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Admiral Zacharias, Dr. Fairbank, John Goette, and Senator Brewster.

Mr. Denny: Well, ladies and gentlemen, what do you think about tonight's question? If you, the American people, want to make your opinions felt, now is your time to do it and do it quickly by writing a letter to your Con-

gressman, writing to your local paper and to Town Hall.

If you want a copy of tonight's program, complete with questions and answers, write to Town Hall, New York 18, New York, and enclose 10 cents to cover the cost of printing and mailing.

Now next Tuesday, from Battle Creek, Michigan, we'll discuss the question, "What Should We Do To Win the Cold War With Russia?" Our speakers will be Congressman Dewey Short, Republican from Missouri; Louis Fischer, foreign correspondent and author; Arthur Gaeth, foreign correspondent and ABC commentator; and Dr. Daniel Q. Posin, profes-

sor of physics at North Dakota State College.

The following two weeks, that is the next two weeks, we present two questions of concern to both employees and business executives alike. On December 28, from Milwaukee, the topic will be, "Is Labor Entitled to Another Wage Increase?"

On January 4, back in Town Hall, we'll discuss the question, "Are Corporate Profits Too High?" Now we'll be away from Town Hall, New York, these next two meetings, so they will not be televised, but anyway, make your plans to be with us next Tuesday and every Tuesday at the sound of the crier's bell. (*Applause.*)